April 29, 2008
Someone Call the Doctor—Regions Without Borders?
Two fine studies have been released this year that can guide the slow-growing Midwest in finding its “way forward.” At a time when national sentiment has been running high to tighten national borders between the U.S. and other nations, both reports strongly argue for lowering restrictions on nearby borders—namely those between Midwest states and between the U.S. and Canada along the Great Lakes border. So too, cooperative strategies across local borders are urged to address the Midwest’s economic challenges.
Accomplished journalist R.C. Longworth recently published an insightful and accessible book containing lucid explanations and gripping Midwest stories that bring to life how global upheaval and technological changes have affected the Midwest economy. From farm to factory, from small town to metropolis, Longworth tells stories of the region, its places, and its people. To gather his observations, he spent months traveling around the region. And, having been born and raised in small-town Iowa and covered the region and the world for a major Chicago newspaper, Longworth knows where to look!
More importantly, Longworth understands today’s basic mechanisms of economic change—and their impacts on places and people. To be sure, owing largely to technological advances in communication and transportation, the world has “gone flat” in one sense. Goods and services can be produced anywhere and delivered right here, thereby exposing Midwest workers to competition and upheaval.
However, these same changes have concurrently made the economic landscape “more spikey” than ever. Those places that have succeeded in the new environment are well-advantaged mountains of economic specialization and formidable scale. Such places include large metropolitan areas and mega-cities composed of several proximate cities that draw the best and brightest talents together and that produce advanced services in high-valued legal, consulting, technology, administration and the arts. They also include emerging manufacturing regions such as the mid-South—home of foreign-domiciled auto production.
What holds back the Midwest from such invention and re-invention? Longworth believes many Midwesterners still do not understand globalization and instead cling to ideas and strategies that attempt to bring back the region’s glorious form and past. Looking at its reflection in today’s global looking glass can help the region to find new directions—to imagine a new Midwest economic landscape.
In searching for the correct policy framework to re-work the region, Longworth also believes that national governments are too “clumsy … to cope with a post-national world. … But that the smaller building blocks—cities, counties and states—are too weak and isolated to swing much weight by themselves in an economy that spans the globe.” Accordingly, the Midwest must put aside some long-standing boundaries and competitive behaviors such as inter-state tax competition and balkanized transportation systems. Instead, Longworth calls for extensive regionwide dialogue to achieve creative and cooperative policies.
The region has common interests and goals, but fails to recognize and act effectively. To move forward, regionwide conversations must take place, perhaps assisted by a region-wide publication—electronic or print or both. To be a wellspring of new ideas and policies, the Midwest must have at least one think tank of its own to see the region’s greater possibility for growth and re-invention. Longworth calls on regional foundations, research universities, public leaders, and Reserve Banks to move quickly and boldly in this direction. The Southern Growth Policies Board —founded in 1971—may be one model to draw on as the region fashions its own organization to serve as the fountain for cooperative development.
Not all of Longworth’s immediate prescriptions are intangible. The region is rich in the assets of wealth creation such as highly skilled professionals, cultural and recreational draws, and global company centers. But in observing successful regions in the age of globalization, Longworth sees that proximity and scale count for much in marshalling diverse assets into globally meaningful centers. He proposes that the region consider bold interpersonal transportation systems such as high speed rail.
Another recent study—this one from the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program—also analyzes the new global economic paradigm and how the Midwest must adapt to its challenges. John Austin and his co-authors take the regional approach to global economic adaptation one step further by recognizing that, for the Midwest, the lowering of national border barriers is acutely important. Along the Great Lakes, Canada’s people and resources closely hug the border and are closely integrated with the Midwest economy. Over two-thirds of cross-border trade between Canada and the U.S. takes place among Great Lakes states and the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The region shares many industries that span the border. Automotive, steel, biotechnology, and recreation/tourism are closely linked in their supply chains, transportation infrastructure, and work force. Such industries and their region could benefit from something more like the European Common Market approach.
But according to Austin, at a time when the Midwest must maximize its advantages to achieve competitive prominence, border restrictions have been rising rather than falling. As border security measures have increased,, border-crossing times have been rising, along with general doubts and uncertainty concerning the openness of the border. So too, cooperative initiatives to clean-up the region’s shared water resources are not moving along fast enough. More generally, the region does not recognize its shared interests—especially the great potential to grow and develop through joint study and policy action.
What might such policy actions be? The report lays out a blueprint for Bi-National Great Lakes economic leadership:
● By 2010, Develop a Bi-National Innovation Fund and Strategy
● By 2010, Redevelop North America’s Freshwater Coast
● By 2015, Define and Implement the “U.S.–Canada Border of the Future”
● By 2025, Realize BiNational Great Lakes Carbon Goals and Renewable Energy Standards
● By 2030, Create a Common Market for Commerce and Human Capital
As a long-time researcher, observer, and policy-discussion participant in this arena, I am encouraged to find these ideas being resurrected. As long ago as the 1980s, during the very troubled economic times in the Midwest, many of these same observations and recommendations were advanced.
Two developments dampened forward momentum. For one, the region’s economy enjoyed a strong rebound during the 1990s as surging U.S. economic growth shook the region from its torpor. The region’s flagship companies learned much from their global competitors coming out of the 1980s. While the rebound was welcome and enjoyable, some of the driving force behind fundamental policy innovation in regional development policy was lost through complacency.
The second reason: No region-wide dialogue was created on a sustained basis, and no organizations took on a leadership role in driving forward such a regionwide agenda. The sole exception might be efforts to restore and clean up the region’s fresh waters in the Great Lakes basin, which have progressed thanks to regional organizations such as the Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Commission, and a strong supporting cast.
This time around, inspired by new work, such as the Longworth book and Austin’s study, I believe that we will (very soon) see at least some exploratory efforts towards an enduring pan-regional policy network.
Posted by Testa at 2:32 PM | Comments (1)
April 21, 2008
Innovation: Measurement and Policies
By Rick Mattoon
It has become almost hackneyed to proclaim that we live in a knowledge economy driven by innovation. The mantra of current economic development gurus is that the race goes to the smartest and the swiftest. Yet, despite this popular consensus that innovation may be the key factor in determining future growth in the economy, we actually know very little about how to measure innovation and what policies might influence innovation.
To begin with, we need a definition. Most definitions of innovation begin with “big bang” product innovation that alters the course of economies and enhances the quality of life. The invention of the light bulb and the airplane, as well as biotech breakthroughs, are just a few examples. But large gains are also made through process innovations that are often more subtle. The application of information technology to banking and financial firms and the advent of inventory and logistics management in retail trade come to mind. These process innovations change the efficiency with which inputs are used while vastly increasing the scale of output. This leads to goods and services that are faster, cheaper, and better. In fact, when the Chicago Fed studied the turnaround in the Midwest economy in the mid-1990s, we concluded that part of the region’s success was based on improving the efficiency of the existing economic base. Innovation in traditional industries explained much of the turnaround, rather than the creation of wholly new industries or products.
In January 2008, the Advisory Committee on Measuring Innovation in the 21st Century Economy issued a thoughtful report on how we might define and measure innovation. The report postulates that, while innovation is critical to the economy, “the nexus between innovation and growth is one of the least understood areas of economic life.” To bring clarity, the committee defined innovation as “the design, invention, development, and/or implementation of new or altered products, services, processes, systems, organizational structures, or business models for the purpose of creating new value for customers in a way that improves the financial returns to the firm.” The report then set about suggesting proxies for measuring innovation.
The committee rejected the notion of coming up with a single, all encompassing measure. Given that the economy and individual firms do not innovate the same way at the same time, the committee felt a single measure would lead to policy distortions. For example, it might be inappropriate to legislate public policy supporting an industry or firm that is going through a rapid period of innovation over an industry whose innovation breakthrough might be several years away. However, the report suggests a clear starting point by emphasizing that we need a better measurement of total factor productivity (TFP)—the change in productivity left over after accounting for the growth in labor and capital. Total factor productivity does provide a measure that can be augmented and refined by several policies to expand data collection on firm investment in key factors such as research and development, technology, and human capital.
So what policies did the Committee specifically suggest? Here is just a partial list:
• Develop annual, industry-level measures of total factor productivity by restructuring the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States (NIPAs);
• Create a supplemental innovation account for the NIPAs in order to expand the categories of innovation inputs and allow those inputs to be tracked as they flow between industries;
• Improve service sector data and increase survey coverage to provide the data needed to improve estimates from the integrated gross domestic product/productivity accounts and supplemental innovation account;
• Improve measurement of intangibles, particularly intellectual property; and
• Better leverage existing data and increase access to enhance research on innovation.
In addition the committee recommended the business community:
• Institute firm-level measurements of innovation to test the correlation on firm performance; and
• Develop and implement best practice in innovation management and accounting.
Another interesting local approach is a new innovation index developed by the University of Michigan at Dearborn’s Center for Innovation Research. This index tracks six subindexes that reflect the state of innovation in Michigan and will be reported on a quarterly basis. The six measures are:
• Trademark applications,
• Innovation workers (measured as a percentage of the labor force),
• Small Business Administration (SBA) loans,
• Venture capital,
• Incorporations, and
• Gross job creation.
The index is benchmarked to 100 for the first quarter of 2007. The most recent reading of the index is 95.8.
These efforts at measuring innovation in the economy continue to be a messy process, but the potential dividends of better understanding and calibrating the role of innovation in economic growth is certainly an important step forward. Hopefully better innovation metrics will help guide policymakers and business leaders to make appropriate investments that will strengthen economic growth.
The Department of Commerce continues the dialogue by hosting a summit in Chicago on May 22 discussing actions to be made to secure America's competitiveness.
Posted by Testa at 12:00 PM | Comments (0)
March 13, 2007
Higher Education and Chicago’s Development
With economic growth lagging in many Midwest communities, institutions of higher education are being asked to play a bigger role in their surrounding regional economies. This past fall, the Chicago Fed held a conference addressing the role of higher education in promoting regional growth and development.
In what ways does higher education fit into the regional development picture? The ways discussed at the conference were many and varied; certainly, one size does not fit all. In places ranging from Silicon Valley to Route 128 in Boston and even to Fargo, North Dakota, universities are transferring technology to industrial facilities in adjacent industrial parks and to fledgling high tech firms. In other places, including Akron, Ohio, and Rochester, New York, universities are active in helping redirect mature but declining local industries into new products and markets. And Indiana’s Purdue University has embarked on an ambitious engagement and outreach mission along several fronts: teaching, discovery, community outreach, and identifying local targets of economic development.
While the conference did not address the university role in Chicago’s growth and development, our outstanding business schools have clearly played a key role. Today, among many fine business programs, the city touts the perpetual top ten national ranking of Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management and the University of Chicago’s GSB, along with the frequent top ten ranking of Depaul University’s evening MBA program. As we look at Chicago’s industrial and business history, we see how these schools continually pump new life into Chicago’s economy.
For example, advanced business services and corporate headquarters activities are today the hallmark of Chicago’s economy. The city gave birth to some of the most prominent management consulting (NAICS 54161) firms and today continues to host a very significant number of such companies. Chicago ranks third in the U.S. among metropolitan areas in number of management consulting firms, and second in concentration of such firms, at some 120% above the national average.
How did this come about? Writing in the Encyclopedia of Chicago, Christopher McKenna describes the genesis of this Chicago-born industry. “Arthur Andersen, a professor of Accounting at Northwestern University, founded his eponymous firm in 1913. … Arthur Andersen & Co. began to specialize in financial investigations, the forerunner of the modern consulting industry.” And, “instead of employing local banking staff, New York and Boston financiers hired Chicago consultants to analyze the management of Midwestern companies in which they planned to invest.”
Andersen’s initiative was quickly followed in 1914 by Edwin Booz, a recent graduate of Northwestern in psychology. The company eventually became Booz Allen & Hamilton. So too, James O. McKinsey, an expert in cost accounting at the University of Chicago, founded a consulting practice (in 1926) that split off into the firm bearing his name as well as into A.T. Kearney. All became world-wide bulwark companies in what is now a global industry of great strategic importance to the world’s largest companies and businesses.
Jump ahead 50 years to the early 1970s. Chicago’s risk management and risk exchange community was re-invigorated when Leo Melamed, one-time Chairman of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, launched contract trading in international currencies. Also in the 1970s, a former professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Richard Sandor, helped develop the Chicago Board of Trade’s U.S. Treasury futures contract trading.
Today, Chicago is a global leader in financial futures and options trading, with a 23% global share in exchange-traded contracts measured by volume. In addition to direct employment at Chicago’s exchanges and associated clearing operations, trading activity gives rise to ancillary employment in various Chicago businesses such as banking, brokerage, law, business publication, and computer systems and software.
For this industry too, the University of Chicago figures prominently in the story of its birth. University mentors both espoused the social value of trading financial instruments and also developed mathematical pricing models of assets that served as the basis for some trading. As recently described by Leo Melamed, Nobel Laureate and University of Chicago economist, Milton Friedman was a notable inspiration, teacher, and consultant to the launch of currency futures trading in the early 1970s.
Today, Richard Sandor remains busy in Chicago developing a new industry that addresses global climate change by capping polluting air emissions among member firms and then trading credits for pollution reduction among these firms.
Meanwhile, students from Chicago area business schools, such as Joe Mansueto of Morningstar, have recently grown new industries, this one centering on the tracking and analysis of mutual fund products.
In contrast to places such as the Stanford-Silicon Valley area, Chicago is not especially recognized for research and science-based commercial spinoffs from its universities. But several local universities are attempting to marry their business curriculums with their science and engineering activity. For one, the College of Business at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC) is training future business leaders by encouraging them to construct business plans for inventions and intellectual property coming out of UIC labs. One recent sale of note involves a product that will possibly halve the time it takes orthodonic devices to straighten teeth.
What does this history imply for public policy? For starters, if we are to interfere effectively for purposes of economic development, we surely must understand the nexus among our assets and institutions. Chicago is clearly a “business town,” and its business schools have not only supported the business climate by training graduates for local companies but also indirectly by spinning off new businesses and industries.
But in considering issues of greatly enhanced public support or subsidy, it would be a mistake to attribute too much to universities alone. That is because causation goes both ways. While Chicago’s business schools have spawned much local growth, so too has local business growth created and supported the growth of universities and business school programs.
A city’s assets and institutions are best thought of, perhaps, as enjoying a symbiotic relationship. Accordingly, local public policy should start by strengthening inter-connections among local enterprises and enterprising people. Government likely has no great ability to pick and choose which particular connections to strengthen. And so, the primary course should be to provide desired and cost-effective public services and infrastructure, especially in transportation and communication. Restrained yet well-designed regulation and taxation should be another part of the mix.
Next, public-private programs and civic partnerships may be helpful in drawing closer social and cooperative connections among our diverse Chicago communities, industries, and civic institutions. As Chicago’s business history has shown, some amazing successes can arise from enterprising partners in a dynamic city.
Posted by Testa at 10:16 AM | Comments (0)
February 14, 2007
The auto region continues to reshape
By Guest Blogger Thomas Klier
On Wednesday, February 14, DaimlerChrysler AG announced a restructuring of its North American Chrysler Group. Adjusting its vehicle production capacity to continued market share losses, the company will eliminate shifts at three different assembly plants (Newark, DE, and Warren, MI, in 2007, St. Louis, MO, in 2008) and idle the Newark plant in 2009 (that plant is identified in figure 1 by a blue star).
Conversely, Toyota Motor Corporation, in response to strong growth in the North American market, is about to announce where it will build its next vehicle assembly plant in North America. The company is looking to expand its footprint of production facilities to meet its goal of achieving 60% of local production. Several weeks ago a story appeared in the Wall Street Journal identifying a handful of locations that are being considered by the company (identified in figure 1 by the red stars).
What are the main drivers underlying a decision to locate an assembly plant? This blog suggests a number of influences.
First, let’s briefly outline the current industry geography. Today there are 68 full-size assembly plants (plus two currently under construction) producing cars and light trucks, such as minivans and sport utility vehicles, in the U.S. and Canada. Figure 1 shows them all with the exception of the lone West Coast plant (the GM-Toyota joint venture called NUMMI, which is located in Fremont, California, in the San Francisco Bay area).
The striking feature of figure 1 is the high degree of clustering exhibited by this industry. The vast majority of the plants are located in the interior of the country, extending south from Michigan and Ontario in a rather narrow band. In addition, one can see the importance of transportation infrastructure. It is a key location factor for manufacturing industries, such as the auto sector, which are operating based on lean manufacturing principles. Interstate highways and rail lines (the map only shows interstate highways) are enabling assembly facilities to connect with their supplier base on a just-in-time basis.
In a second quarter 2006 issue of Economic Perspectives, Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen analyzed how the geography of assembly (as well as auto parts production) facilities has evolved in the U.S. and Canada since 1980. They identify noticeable changes in the industry’s geography. These changes, however, occurred gradually, in evolutionary fashion over the last three decades.
Two major trends have shaped the footprint of today’s assembly facilities: Foreign-owned assembly plants gravitated towards the southern end of the auto region, preferring warmer climes and a work force that had not previously been employed in auto assembly. With two exceptions, all of foreign-owned assembly plants operating today have been so-called greenfield plants, i.e., newly constructed plants on land that was previously not a manufacturing site. The domestic assembly facilities, on the other hand, re-grouped in the northern end of today’s auto region after decades of serving the major population centers directly. They began shutting down their coastal plants in the late 1970s in response to the changing economics of transportation costs associated with serving the national market.
And so today’s auto region with a clearly defined north-south extension came about. Concentration of locations remains very important for this industry: Assembly plants need to be near their supplier base. Yet there are reasons for them not to be right next to one another. Assembly plants are large manufacturing facilities drawing their work force from an area larger than the immediate vicinity. Notice in figure 1 how many of the 50-mile circles drawn around assembly plant locations do not overlap.
How do the latest developments fit the ongoing re-shaping of the auto region described above? Chrysler, in line with recent restructurings last year by GM and Ford (plant closings in Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, and Virginia as indicated by the other blue stars on the map), is trimming a production facility at the periphery of its manufacturing footprint. As a result, the domestic vehicle production has recently become more concentrated in the Midwest than it has been for many decades. For example, the announced closing of the Delaware assembly plant leaves only one vehicle assembly facility in the Northeast (there were six as recently as 1980). Should Toyota choose one of the locations mentioned in the press, it could best be described as "in-fill" development. It would fill a gap in the auto region which was extended considerably further south by assembly plants that located in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina during the 1990s.
And so the combination of recently announced plant closures and a soon to be announced plant opening are reinforcing the shaping of an auto region that is located in the interior of the country, with a north-south orientation, extending northeast into Ontario.
What are the implications of this analysis for Michigan and the Midwest? In Michigan especially, intense discussion is under way concerning what role, if any, public policy can play in shaping the region’s future. Currently, the competitive struggles of the domestic automotive companies (formerly known as the Big Three) and their suppliers are affecting the Midwest economy. Surely, much will depend on individual companies’ abilities to restructure and find ways forward. However, as the research by Klier and McMillen suggests, at the same time as traditional automotive companies are retrenching, they are also regrouping closer to the traditional (midwestern) center of the automotive industry. Actions speak louder than words in many instances. Here, locational decisions strongly suggest that the Midwest remains a highly productive place to manufacture automotive parts and vehicles. The region’s advantages lie in the fact that: 1) it is already the center of production so that proximity to suppliers makes it cost effective in many respects, 2) its transportation infrastructure is highly developed to serve manufacturing, and 3) its existing work force is highly skilled and trained in these industries. Accordingly, in addition to moving in new economic directions, local policy actions to help restore the region’s place in manufacturing seem not misplaced.
Posted by Testa at 4:19 PM | Comments (0)
January 22, 2007
Chicago's Pursuit of the Global Prize
Policy and business leaders in Chicago continue to advance the metropolitan area’s prospects as a global hub for professional and financial services. This initiative arises from both necessity and opportunity. Chicago’s traditional markets, principally in the surrounding Midwest, are not growing rapidly. At the same time, however, the Chicago economy specializes in advanced producer service sectors that are increasingly traded more broadly and, in many cases, internationally.
As the business service center of the Midwest, serving regional markets and industries, Chicago companies’ prospects for growth are somewhat limited. That is so largely for two reasons. First, the Midwest economic base centers on agriculture and manufacturing. Since productivity growth is so very high in these industries, and competition keeps commodity prices low, income and revenue (and attendant jobs) grow slowly. The second reason is climate. As the U.S. economy restructures toward information industries and knowledge workers, service production is being pulled toward locations where workers prefer to live, often milder climes.
However, globalization of the economy has also brought new opportunities to populous information-based cities like Chicago. Large cities often have wonderful amenities that are not dependent on climate, such as sports, restaurants, museums, and cultural diversity. But more fundamentally, it is because expanding global trade in goods, services, and capital requires the complex and specialized functions and industry sectors that are concentrated in large cities, including legal services, logistics, distribution, finance, insurance, business meetings, R&D, and professional business services.
Chicago has been developing such sectors almost since its inception. Today, Chicago features world-leading risk exchanges, universities, business meeting and personal air travel firms, legal services, headquarters facilities, and management consultancies.
During the 1990s, the growth of Chicago’s professional services was robust. According to the data reported on payroll employment, the Chicago metropolitan area added a net 80,000 jobs in the sector from 1990 to 1999, more than the Los Angeles metropolitan area and more than New York City.
However, since then, job performance in Chicago has often been much weaker, raising doubts about whether the city’s economic structure has divorced itself from the surrounding region as much as previously believed. The chart below displays year-over-year growth in the professional, technical, and R&D sectors. Employment growth experienced year-over-year declines for most of the 2002-2004 period, before reviving in 2005.
How much of Chicago’s business service economy has expanded to global markets or even to other large U.S. cities in the global network?
We know very little about the geography and changing geography of these hallmark industry sectors. However, one informative study by Peter J. Taylor and Robert E. Lang of the Metropolitan Policy Program at The Brookings Institution measures the prominence of major global service companies among large cities in the world.
Taylor and Lang examine 100 global companies drawn from the business or producer sectors of accounting, advertising, banking/finance, insurance, law, and management consulting. For each city, the sum presence of their offices (weighted by size and function) determines a score for a city’s commercial presence and ties to the global city service network.
According to the Taylor-Lang study, Chicago scores high in its global connectivity, both relative to other U.S. cities and relative to the world’s major cities. Among U.S. cities, Chicago ranks second only to New York. Among world cities, Chicago ranks seventh, behind London, New York, Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, and Singapore.
The Taylor-Lang study scores Chicago’s connections with domestic cities such as Atlanta and New York in the same way it scores connections with international cities such as Sydney. This seems correct. International borders can be arbitrary. And to otherwise score border-crossings might bias the results toward cities located on continents where national boundaries are near each other, such as Europe.
The study does provide a separate “hinterland” scale for each city, which tries to measure the degree to which a city’s global connectivity relies on nearby national trading relations. Here, with the exception of New York City, U.S. cities tend to be less international than those on other continents. However, Chicago again scores well. It places third among U.S. cities, behind New York and Miami.
How this relates to Chicago’s recent growth performance and prospects is not clear. The construction of the Taylor-Lang study is creative, clever, and somewhat revealing, but it provides more impressionistic than definitive evidence of global linkages among producer services. Those who would like to draw their own conclusions from the evidence should take a look at the authors’ map of each global city’s linkages, including Chicago. Outside of North America, for example, the map suggests that Chicago's economy links strongly with Zurich, Switzerland, and Sydney, Australia.
Chicago’s employment in business-professional services is once again growing strongly, at a 3% annual year-over-year pace. If the recent period of weak performance reflects some unusual and fleeting conditions such as a post 9-11 falloff in business travel and related business service activity, then perhaps Chicago’s march to global success will now continue.
Posted by Testa at 10:37 AM | Comments (2)
December 15, 2006
A Chicago-Milwaukee Region?
Could cities located near one another, Milwaukee and Chicago for example, enhance their respective growth and development through closer linkages? Why might a greater Chicago–Milwaukee metropolitan area want stronger ties, and what policies, if any, might be considered to bring about such a union?
There are several reasons why larger metropolitan areas are generally leading U.S. economic growth. In recent decades, larger metropolitan areas have typically become more specialized in managerial and technical occupations, while smaller metropolitan economies have become more specialized in production activities. For example, one recent article found that those U.S. metropolitan areas having a population above 5 million had increased their concentration of management to production workers to 39 percent by 1990 from 10 percent in 1950. In part, this increasing concentration in larger cities is due to advances in communication and transportation that have allowed companies and organizations to administer and manage from a central location or to travel easily to multiple production locations.
In this light, it is understandable, then, that larger cities have also tended to grow more rapidly in terms of income and/or population. That is because specialized professional and managerial occupations tend to pay more than production. Moreover, since at least the late 1970s in the U.S., economic returns to labor, including wages and salaries, have generally been growing faster for managerial, technical, and other occupations attendant to higher educational attainment.
A second reason for such shifting specialization and growth owes much to the growth in work force participation of women. In the U.S., the labor force participation of working age women rose from 37.7 in 1960 to almost 59.6 percent today. Moreover, the educational attainment of women has also been rising such that it now exceeds men among the younger age cohorts. Since young singles tend to marry someone with similar education, this has given rise to growing numbers of “power couples” who often must find not one, but two, specialized jobs in the same labor market. Because large metropolitan areas have both deep labor markets and more specialized occupational opportunities, these places have become magnets for such “power couples.” In turn, firms respond to the greater labor supply of professionals by siting their establishments in larger metropolitan areas, and thereby transform local economies.
There are several reasons to keep an eye on the greater Chicago and Milwaukee areas to examine the prospects that they will someday become a single labor market and benefit from the attendant economies of larger scale and scope of such a merger. The Chicago and Milwaukee areas are only 86 miles apart, as measured from city center to city center. The Chicago metro area is more populous at 9.4 million as compared to 1.5 million in Milwaukee, but together they yield a population of 11.0 million.
Historically, Chicago–Milwaukee work force linkages have been limited. Only 13,000 Milwaukee residents commute to Chicago, daily, as of year 2000, up from 1,600 in year 1990. The reverse commute is even smaller. However, commuting in both directions is growing rapidly.
Still, a closer look at some important subsectors of professional industry workers is suggestive of the greater work force that may soon arise from combination. The chart below combines industry employment for Chicago and Milwaukee metro areas across several professional, management and business service sectors. As combined, for example, employment in the Chicago–Milwaukee “computer systems design” sector would rank second to New York, allowing Chicago to bypass both the San Francisco and the Los Angeles metro areas. Other sectors of mutual benefit in Chicago and Milwaukee can be seen at the Midwest Economy website.
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While such stronger within-industry labor markets might be advantageous, the additional attraction across multiple sectors may be greater still. For households with members having differing but specialized occupations, the possibilities for a multiple match of people with jobs in a combined Chicago–Milwaukee metro area labor pool could be great. This would enhance companies’ ability to attract and retain skilled labor in both regions.
So too, not all jobs within the professional and business services sectors require the very highest educational attainment. For example, according to recent estimates of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, office and administrative support jobs comprise one-third of all employment in the combined professional services, finance, and management of companies when measured in industry sectors. So too, spin-off employment would also generate a wide range of local employment as the spending of added service professionals ripples through the local economy. This feature is especially important since job needs are great for lesser-skilled labor in both markets.
How might Chicago and Milwaukee push along their destiny as a combined metropolitan area? One low-cost way is to publicize their mutual proximity in marketing each region to prospective employers and to job recruits. Both Chicago and Milwaukee are highly active in economic development marketing. Of course, private sector employers and employment intermediaries may also be effective in spreading such information about the greater breadth of employment opportunities.
Another policy avenue may be greater investment in transportation between the metro areas that would facilitate commuting flows. Both interstate highways and train transportation are now in service. The possible labor market advantages of easier and more dependable auto and passenger train travel might weigh significantly in the consideration of any future roadway/rail expansion and maintenance decisions. Combined efforts in applying for federal transportation grant monies to serve a large and more closely-integrated Chicago–Milwaukee market might also be effective—for both personal travel and for freight transportation including railroad.
Milwaukee’s major airport is also located between downtown Milwaukee and downtown Chicago. At a time when the Chicago area’s air travel capacity is strained, better access to Milwaukee’s Mitchell field could be advantageous.
Other cooperative ventures and ideas have yet to be identified. The absence of organized efforts to do so is a bit puzzling in the Chicago–Milwaukee corridor. In contrast, the advent of the trade agreements between Canada and the U.S. has sparked any number of private and private-public associations to promote natural trade flows across the border within local corridors. As the chart below shows, the progress of employment growth has not been especially robust in either metropolitan area over the past 15 years. Perhaps a little détente along the Illinois-Wisconsin border might be advantageous to all.
Posted by Testa at 9:02 AM | Comments (3)
December 4, 2006
Chicago Plans for Freight
The Chicago area economy developed on its ability to move freight. With heightened global trade, Chicago area freight transportation has grown rapidly and it is projected to continue to do so, leading to added congestion on highways that are shared by automobile drivers and trucks alike.
This raises important questions as to how the Chicago region should plan future modifications to its transportation infrastructure. The answers are not completely obvious for several reasons. To some degree, Chicago’s economy is shifting toward high-valued service production and away from freight-laden manufacturing. As a result, the value of Chicago’s existing roadways to bring workers to and from their offices is rising in relation to their value for moving goods around and through Chicago. And even with some concerted and likely expensive actions to expand and reconfigure infrastructure, there does not appear to be room for all roadway (and rail) traffic.
Building roadway capacity to serve all possible traffic is not an option. To do so would be too expensive in both construction costs and in taking up limited urban land. Yet, the region will want to act to maximize its ability to handle as much freight (and auto traffic) as possible. And so, in addition to some expansion of transportation capacity, the region will need to determine the most critical infrastructure to repair and build. So too, the region will need to engage in more efficient planning on the location of housing and commercial activity in order to economize on overall travel demand. Finally, more rational operational and pricing policies allocating existing transportation infrastructure will need to be adopted.
Rising global trade has dramatically added to cross-continental freight traffic through Chicago from imported goods landed on the East Coast going west and from the West Coast headed east. Much of this freight activity takes place in Chicago’s large railroad yards and side tracks. Chicago is also a major destination and transfer point for freight carried by truck. Because highway overpasses and underpasses for rail have not been constructed everywhere or they are of insufficient height, auto and truck traffic becomes further congested and delayed.
Adding to local truck-related congestion is the fact that, in order to accommodate rising freight traffic in a cost effective way, goods are now hauled in standardized containers. These containers are often transferred between transportation modes within Chicago, especially by “lifting” containers from truck to train and train to truck. According to World Business Chicago, the Chicago area now ranks among the top five cities in the world in container “lifts” behind Hong Kong and Singapore, where freight lifts mainly take place onto and off of large ocean-going vessels.
The strongest impulse of local policymakers is to find ways to keep transportation flowing through Chicago and possibly build on it as the opportunities arise. By one estimate, rail freight companies and their suppliers employ about 37,000 workers in the Chicago area, while trucking accounts for another 50,000 jobs.
In addition, proximity and low-cost access to delivered goods support income and jobs in related industries. The Chicago region and surrounding Midwest continue to host one of the nation’s largest concentrations of manufacturing establishments, in part due to these transportation advantages for bringing in raw materials and shipping out more-finished products. So too, Chicago remains a major center of wholesale and warehousing operations for its own manufacturing companies and for the greater Midwest region. Even aside from these related industries, as the nation’s third most populous metropolitan area, Chicago needs significant local freight capacity just to supply goods to its own consumers and households. Such freight-carrying ability translates into lower cost of living and greater variety of goods in generally attracting workers and other residents.
Further opportunities for Chicago to handle freight are in the offing. Much global freight now travels through the Panama Canal. Over the next few years, the canal will reach maximum capacity, while its ability to handle large vessels is becoming somewhat obsolete. Although Panama is planning to upgrade the Canal, during the interim the demands on overland inter-continental freight as a possible alternative will rise considerably. Here, Chicago’s history as a railroad town figures prominently, since the nation’s major railroad lines converge in Chicago. Much of the nation’s long-haul railroad freight now travels through the Chicago region, with much of it being transferred from one line to another, or to and from another mode of transportation, especially trucks.
To make headway in accommodating freight, local initiatives have been formed as public–private partnerships. One such partnership is the CREATE rail infrastructure improvement program. The program is a cost-sharing partnership among the Chicago region’s railroads, the City, and the State of Illinois, which will loosen bottlenecks in railroad freight flow through the city.
More comprehensive approaches are also underway to plan for and accommodate more transportation. A new agency (CMAP) has recently been created, consolidating the Chicago area’s existing transportation planning agency with its land use authority. It is anticipated that more careful and coordinated consideration of the region’s land use, housing, and transportation will reduce overall highway travel demand in the region by both cars and trucks. Freight traffic considerations and opportunities are also explicitly on CMAP’s agenda as the agency works to promote collaborative planning in the Chicago region.
From a cost–benefit standpoint, it would be foolish, even it were feasible, to expand infrastructure to meet all possible freight traffic. Land is scarce and expensive in Chicago, which argues against unlimited expansion of land for use in freight transportation. Local benefits of infrastructure expansion may be especially limited for freight that flows through Chicago without off-loading. In these instances, the benefits of Chicago’s freight capacity are more national in scope, or perhaps of benefit to the broader Midwest region. For this reason, projects such as CREATE are requesting that the federal government as well as private freight carriers help finance local infrastructure.
New pricing policies that charge freight users for roads and rail can also help to ration limited roadway capacity and allocate it toward its highest value use. For example, the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority now charges higher fees for driving during peak traffic times on its highways in and around Chicago. At the same time, electronic payment of tolls helps to speed both cars and trucks through toll stations. In looking for further improvements, policy makers in the Chicago region can examine a host of models and experiments from around the world that are pricing highway congestion, often in combination with privatized ownership or operation of transportation infrastructure.
The Chicago region cannot probably accommodate all of the nation’s freight needs in coming years, nor would it want to do so. Still, Chicago’s built legacy of infrastructure affords it opportunities for further growth and development in the freight arena and in spin-off economic development activities. Through thoughtful planning and evaluation, cost-effective operation, and well-structured pricing mechanisms, the Chicago Region can realize a broader scope of development opportunities.
Posted by Testa at 10:04 AM | Comments (3)
October 5, 2006
Indiana observations
Each autumn, I have traveled down to the Indianapolis area to deliver a local perspective on the economy to the Indiana Economic Development Forum. This autumn, the Forum addresses the theme of “work force training and education.” As I survey Indiana’s economic performance over the past 15 years, it strikes me that Indiana is on the right track with its strategic focus on boosting work force training and education. So too, where feasible, an emphasis on technology transfer, firm growth, and entrepreneurial activity may be needed to create matching job opportunities for the more highly skilled Hoosiers.
Indiana and its neighboring Midwestern states rank near the top in manufacturing concentration. Even so, as the figure below shows, the deep recessions of the early 1980s sharply shifted the region’s share of manufacturing jobs elsewhere (right axis, green line). As the steel and auto industries waned here, the computer and military equipment industries grew elsewhere.
The figure also reveals the period’s depressing effects on the region’s per capita income as a result of manufacturing job loss and slow recovery (left axis, blue line). Since then, per capita income, as compared to the national average, has not fully recovered in the Great Lakes region, nor in Indiana, for that matter.
However, Indiana’s job growth and share of manufacturing jobs have recently out-performed the surrounding region (bottom chart). Indeed, even though the level of jobs has declined, Indiana has exceeded its 1980s share of the nation’s manufacturing jobs. Consequently, while the relative per capita income in the Great Lakes region has taken a dive over the last few years, Indiana’s income has remained about the same in relation to the national average.
Something is going right in Indiana, or at least it is going a little better than in surrounding Midwestern states. But given the notably stronger performance gains in Indiana’s share of the nation’s manufacturing jobs, shouldn’t its per capita income be rising a bit, rather than being stuck in place?
The answer again likely lies in today’s broad economic trends. Indiana’s manufacturing wages lie below its Midwestern neighbors. This can be seen in the figure below, which illustrates the higher hourly earnings of production workers in Michigan versus Indiana. Perhaps the state’s favorable wage environment for employers, along with other business climate attractions, partly explain its job share gains in manufacturing, even as per capita income gains are not quite so robust.
Another reason for less robust progress in Indiana’s per capita income can be found in service sector versus manufacturing wage trends. While average wage levels in manufacturing tend to exceed average service sector wage rates in the nation, service sector wage growth has been catching up to manufacturing.
How can Indiana improve its living standards? In our market-oriented economy, higher wages and earnings are currently being paid to those with higher skills and education. For this reason, investment in education and work force training are one important part in achieving higher income for Hoosiers.
In addition to higher skills, there must be job opportunities available for those enhanced skills and training. Sometimes, such local job opportunities do emerge as new firms and capital investment migrate into states in search of favorable work force skills and education. However, in other instances, skilled workers move out of state in search of greater opportunity. To forestall this loss of skilled workers, Indiana and other states are pursuing not only work force training and education, but also local technology transfer from technical universities along with the encouragement of entrepreneurial ventures.
Posted by Testa at 2:47 PM | Comments (0)
July 19, 2006
Honda and tax incentives
Honda recently decided on a site in Indiana for its new North American auto assembly plant over sites in Ohio and Illinois. Indiana offered Honda generous incentives of EDGE tax credits, training assistance, and real and personal property tax abatements totaling up to $41.5 million. In addition, the state will provide infrastructure support for water, wastewater, and road improvements of approximately $44 million. This offer was generous relative to packages that have been offered lately by northern states to woo automotive plants. Did the incentives swing the deal for Indiana? And how can states hope to recoup these upfront costs and revenue losses? More importantly, is society well served by such raw-knuckled competition among states for production facilities? The answers are not definitive, but, though often condemned, the use of fiscal incentives may not be such a bad thing.
Large offers of this nature have become commonplace. Speaking at the Chicago Fed’s recent symposium on the automotive parts industry, Sean McAlinden of the Center for Automotive Research reported that the state of Georgia offered Korean carmaker KIA a package estimated to be worth $409 million. This was noticeably larger than the recent average offers of $57 million in tax incentives for automotive assembly plants for northern states and $44.2 million (plus free or subsidized infrastructure and job training) for southern states.
On completion of such deals, company representatives often proclaim that the incentives did not determine the choice of location, but were rather a sweetener or a comforting pledge of good faith. Professional site selection analysts tend to echo these sentiments. Taking such statements at face value, why do states offer such high stakes packages?
No doubt, there are benefits at the ballot box to those elected officials who can brag about bringing jobs and income to the state. It has been argued that these benefits, especially for investment projects that loom large in the media, result in overly generous offers and poor decision-making by state officials. This is one reason that some states enact legal requirements making the terms of such deals easily available to public scrutiny.
But how can states afford to make such offers? One reason is that the public service costs of hosting businesses are usually lower than the taxes paid by them; that is, there is typically a fiscal surplus inherent in state business tax systems that allows state officials to discount the public tax and service bills on new investment. When I examined the likely costs of public services provided to businesses in a 1996 study, I found that, across all U.S. regions, direct business taxes tended to exceed the value of direct service benefits provided to business by a ratio ranging from 1.5:1 to 2:1. This excess may allow room for governments to lower business tax bills through selective incentives.
Even so, opponents of the use of selective tax abatements may argue that incentives were unnecessary and that businesses have an information advantage in bargaining with states for incentives even when they will end up choosing the same location in any event. Certainly, the proclamations of businesses that afterwards contend that incentives were not a primary consideration in their location decision bear this out. If so, states are arguably better off refraining from incentives and instead spending the business tax bounty on public services or returning personal taxes to state residents.
In the case of auto plants, it is interesting to note that even if individual states “give away the store” in luring a particular auto assembly facility, the end result may ultimately benefit the state’s economy. The reason is that the assembly plants typically attract auto parts suppliers to the area. As Chicago Fed economist Thomas Klier has shown (below), a typical assembly plant can draw a significant nearby supplier base. For recently opened assembly plants in North America, an average of 19 to 20 direct suppliers have typically opened up within 60 miles of the plant. More generally, assembly plants tend to pull in many more supplier plants within several hundred miles, and supplier plant employment generally exceeds assembly plant employment by around 3.5:1.
It is true that in the case of the Honda assembly plant in Greensburg, IN, many of the supplier plants will be outside Indiana’s border and tax reach. However, if all or many adjacent states are successful in attracting assembly plants, the spillover benefits of taxation and income will accrue in roughly equal measure to the states. A so-called cluster of automotive production capability may be achieved for the multi-state region.
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Source: Thomas Klier and James Rubenstein.
Click to enlarge image.
But are the incentives necessary to achieve or preserve the region’s cluster of automotive plants? At least for highly capital-intensive industrial activities such as manufacturing, the so-called business climate of the state is paramount. Placement of an expensive investment by a company in a state must be based on a strong conviction that future government leaders will not expropriate the facility’s value through regulation, over-taxation, or non-cooperation in future land use and public infrastructure needs. The situation is not unlike making investments in a foreign country. When the capital investment is fixed and not easily moved, confidence in local government is a key factor in assessing investment risk.
In this regard, Honda’s decision to locate in Indiana rather than Ohio is understandable. While proximity to its large suppliers in Ohio and vicinity was a compelling reason for considering Indiana, the desirability of diversification among government entities may have also been a factor. As for the incentive package, there is surely more to a favorable state business climate than a flashy offer of tax incentives. But at the same time, the offer of a fiscal incentive package may be a strong signal to the business that its presence will be valued. In addition, a sizable and highly visible tax incentive package may represent an implicit acknowledgment by the state that the investment is wanted, making it more difficult for future political leaders to renege on the state’s cooperative relationship with the company.
Of course, implicit tax incentive contracts of this sort work both ways. Companies that receive generous tax incentive packages, but later do not deliver on promised jobs and investments, are easy targets for retribution by state officials. In many instances today, “clawback” provisions are included upfront that eliminate favorable tax treatment if companies do not deliver.
Even so, the “gold standard” by which public policies must be judged is whether the state could possibly do better. Opponents of tax incentives for business argue that, because of such tax breaks, critical public services such as education remain underfunded. In particular, public education suffers, contributing to sub-par income growth and exacerbating social problems such as crime, poor electoral participation, and poor public health. If we accept this view, the economic returns to the practice of competitive business tax incentives are not optimal; the economic returns from any short-term job and income gains to the local economy are less than the foregone returns that greater education spending would bring locally and nationally.
In rebuttal, one might argue that business taxes are not the only possible source of revenue for highly valued public services such as education. An ideal of government is one in which citizens understand both the value of public services provided and the real costs of these benefits and, subsequently, make their choices known at the ballot box.
With the tendency among governments to over-tax business activity, the electorate may believe that they are getting a free ride for public services—that they are not in fact paying for these services. But they are usually mistaken. People and households end up (indirectly) paying for public services in any event. After all, business taxes are ultimately reflected in higher product prices paid by state residents or in lower wages and salaries paid to employees.
So why do many voters and even some policy analysts advocate the taxation of business activity to finance public services that primarily benefit households? Some argue that Americans like their taxes hidden and furthermore that this is a reasonable way for governments to finance high-payoff public services. But this approach has risks. If taxes and prices for public services are hidden, can the citizenry really make sensible decisions about what levels, types, and extent of services government should provide? What do you think?
Posted by Testa at 10:47 AM | Comments (0)
