Poor fiscal performance a problem for both state and local governments in Illinois

For a recent Chicago Fed Letter article, I looked back at the fiscal performance of Illinois’s state and local governments and found that, taken together, Illinois governments had been consistently spending more than they had brought in since at least the late 1980s. I also found that while the typical U.S. state often spent more than its revenues over this period, the extent of Illinois’s overspending (or under-taxing) was significantly greater. Finally, I found that the biggest difference in spending between Illinois and the typical state was that Illinois governments spent more on pensions.[1]

As I discussed in the article, in order to compare Illinois’s fiscal performance with other states’, I had to combine the data for state and local governments together. This was necessary because each state divides responsibilities for its activities differently between state and local governments (for example, some states fund K–12 schools primarily through state revenues, while others fund them primarily through local revenues).

That said, one question that naturally arises from my analysis is this: Was it Illinois’s state government, its local governments, or both that engaged in overspending (or under-taxing)? While it is not feasible to use the U.S. Census Bureau data I used for the Chicago Fed Letter to compare the performance of Illinois’s state or local governments with those of other states and their localities, it is possible to compare the performance of Illinois’s state government with that of its local governments.

There is one important caveat to the comparison that follows. During fiscal years (FY) 1988–2013, an average of 25.2% of local government revenues in Illinois came from the State of Illinois. This means that local governments in Illinois depend quite heavily on revenues from the state government to balance their books, and that some amount of overspending (or under-taxing) at the local level could be the result of unpredictable declines in revenues from the state government. However, at least for FY1988–2013, this does not appear to be the case, because the percentage of local revenues coming from the state was relatively stable (the standard deviation was 1.9 percentage points). Any overspending at the local level, then, was largely the result of locally made decisions.

Figure 1 plots expenditures as a share of revenues for the State of Illinois and for the sum of local governments in Illinois since FY1988.[2] Over these years, local governments (summed together) have never spent less than they brought in. Perhaps surprisingly, the State of Illinois often performed better than local governments, though it did much worse in the years following the 2001 and 2008 recessions. The state spent less than it brought in in seven out of the 26 years the data cover—which is not a good performance, but better than the performance of local governments.

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Because the Census Bureau data lump all 6,963 local governments in Illinois[3] together, it is impossible to know from the data which of these governments are responsible for the overall overspending (or under-taxing). Poor fiscal performance could be concentrated in a few large governments or be widespread. While it is well beyond the scope of this blog post to gather data on the overall fiscal performance of thousands of local governments, I am able to look at the performance of local governments’ pension systems, which is insightful because as I noted earlier, pension spending was one of the biggest contributors to overspending (or under-taxing) by Illinois governments.

Perhaps the best summary measure of the condition of a pension system is its unfunded liability. This is the difference between the discounted present value of all the future payouts the pension has promised to make and the value of the pension’s assets. The unfunded liability, then, is the amount that taxpayers will have to contribute to the pension system in order for it to be able to cover all of its promised future payouts.

Table 1 shows a breakdown by locale of the total unfunded pension liability facing Illinois state and local governments at the end of FY2014.[4] Of the $158.2 billion total, $104.6 billion (66%) was the responsibility of the state government and the remaining $53.6 billion (34%) was the responsibility of local governments. Beyond the state versus local government comparison, things get complicated because some pension systems cover overlapping geographies. The City of Chicago has six separate pension funds covering its workers, and there are three for Cook County employees (Cook County holds almost the entirety of Chicago and a number of its suburbs[5]). On top of that, most municipalities have their own police and firefighters pensions, and there is a single pension system for all other non-Chicago municipality workers called the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund.

Even though the system of local government pensions in Illinois is somewhat complicated, it is clear from table 1 that the City of Chicago is disproportionally responsible for the accumulation of local unfunded pension liabilities. A little over one-fifth of Illinois’s population is in Chicago, but Chicago is responsible for more than half of local government unfunded pension liabilities in Illinois. Chicago residents owe $10,492 per person to their city’s pension systems, on top of the $8,130 per person they owe to the state pension systems.

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To make the comparison of the unfunded liabilities of Illinois’s local governments clearer, I show in table 2 the total per capita state and local unfunded liability by place of residence. There is one wrinkle acknowledged within the table, however, which is that Chicago residents are responsible for the pensions of all Illinois teachers, while Illinois residents outside of Chicago are not responsible for the pensions of Chicago teachers. Thus, perhaps a fairer comparison is to count the unfunded liability of the Chicago teachers’ pension fund as a state-level liability. While this change reduces the unfunded pension liability faced by Chicago residents by 13%, they still would owe a total of $17,506 per person to various Illinois pension systems. Those living outside Chicago would face a smaller, but still quite large, liability per person ($11,954 in suburban Cook County and $10,553 outside Cook County).

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While suburban and downstate police and fire pension systems make up a relatively small part of the total unfunded pension liability of Illinois’s state and local governments (5.6%), pension systems for some municipalities may be in much worse shape than others, so that these liabilities can still matter quite a bit. Table 3 shows the unfunded liabilities for police and firefighters pensions for the 25 most populous cities in Illinois. Chicago is in the worst shape, but residents of Moline, Rock Island, Evanston, and Peoria all owe more than $2,000 per resident to their police and firefighters pension systems. Some cities are in much better shape. For example, residents of Urbana owe fewer than $500 per resident to their systems.

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This blog post shows that overspending (or under-taxing) has long been a problem for both the State of Illinois and the local governments in Illinois, with the accumulation of unfunded pension liabilities playing an important role at both levels of government. And while the City of Chicago has built up a larger unfunded pension liability than that of suburban Chicago and downstate Illinois, every region of Illinois bears some blame for overspending (or, once again, under-taxing).

[1] See the Chicago Fed Letter for a detailed explanation of how I calculate pension spending.

[2]See Chicago Fed Letter for details about how these figures are calculated. Expenditures include the change in pension liabilities.

[3] 2012 Census of Governments (https://www.census.gov/govs/cog/).

[4] All unfunded liability data come from the 2015 Biennial Report of the Illinois Department of Insurance Public Pension Division, http://insurance.illinois.gov/Reports/Pension/pension_biennial_report_2015.pdf.

[5] Technically, a portion of O’Hare Airport—and therefore Chicago—is in DuPage County.

What is Illinois’s Tax Capacity?

A recent study ranked Illinois 47th among U.S. states and Puerto Rico for its fiscal health.1 Particularly concerning was the report’s finding that the combination of total debt, unfunded pension liabilities, and underfunded other post-employment benefits amounts to 61% of total state personal income. In contrast, the same figure for other Seventh District states ranges from a high of 38% in Michigan to a low of 16% in Indiana. Given the magnitude of Illinois’s debt, any plan aimed at improving the state’s fiscal solvency will likely require both expenditure cuts and tax and revenue increases.

So what is the taxable capacity of Illinois? Two broad issues arise. First is the issue of fairness: Would further taxation violate society’s notions of imposing undue burdens on those who can least afford it? Second is the issue of impairing economic activity: Would further taxation discourage economic activity or otherwise drive out taxable wealth to an unacceptable degree?

In this blog post, we describe several methods for identifying a community’s tax capacity. In general, researchers have attempted to measure and compare capacities for specific places by calculating hypotheticals that rely on norms or averages across all places. For example, how much revenue might we expect to raise in a community if we imposed average tax rates there? And how much should a community be spending on public services, given its population characteristics and its need for services? And importantly, how do the two estimates differ? Are there obvious gaps between resources and needs?

Gordon, Auxier, and Iselin (2016)2 used such a representative revenue and expenditure approach to estimate this hypothetical gap in funds a state has available for government operations. The study documents that there is enormous variation in the amount of revenue states collect and what they spend on public goods and services. To drill down to tax capacity, the study measures what each state would collect in revenues and spend on government services if it followed national averages, adjusted for state-specific economic and demographic factors. Table 1, section (1) shows the actual gap, or the difference between actual revenues and expenditures, in FY2012, assuming that states rely only on revenues that they raise themselves through taxes and fees. The gaps are sizable, but adding in federal transfers largely erases the gaps. Turning to the hypotheticals as they relate to tax capacity, Table 1, section (2) compares representative revenues, or revenues that a state would raise if it had an average tax structure, to representative expenditures, or expenditures if the state had an average spending per capita. In contrast to the actual gap, the representative gap remains even after the addition of federal transfers in all of the Seventh District states other than Iowa. In this hypothetical case, if Seventh District states (other than Iowa) adopted a nationally representative tax structure, they would not have sufficient resources even after federal transfers to provide a representative level of public expenditures.

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Haughwout et al. (2003)3 developed a more refined analysis, termed the “revenue-hill” method, that estimates the deterioration in tax capacity that takes place as higher tax rates discourage taxable activity. The revenue hill builds a hypothetical schedule of tax rates and revenues that demonstrates how fully a city is utilizing its tax base. The goal is to build a “Laffer Curve” that allows policymakers to estimate the economic effects of the next tax dollar (e.g., effect on employment). The closer the measure is to the top of the hill, the closer the city is to exhausting its tax capacity. Once a city is over the top of the hill, increases in tax rates will become so unproductive that revenues actually decline. These measures can be constructed for each tax base a city might use. Therefore, while a city may have reached capacity for one tax base (e.g., sales tax), it may still have capacity in another (e.g., property tax). Haughwout et al. (2003) examined four cities—New York, Philadelphia, Houston, and Minneapolis—and found that only Minneapolis was “comfortably” below its revenue hill, and thus had additional tax capacity. In the case of Minneapolis, additional taxes could provide net benefits to property owners. New York and Houston were at the top of their revenue hills, implying that additional taxes would have a negative impact on employment.

Finally, Bo Zhao and Jennifer Weiner of the Boston Fed suggested the “municipal-gap” method for measuring tax capacities across municipalities in Connecticut, by recognizing that taxable capacity can only be measured in the context of a government’s particular needs and resource costs in providing adequate services.4  For example, limited tax capacity can exist when a community faces higher costs or fewer resources for providing public services (or both). In both cases, it can be driven by economic, topographic, and demographic factors specific to the community (e.g., a relatively high rate of poverty or significant risk of extreme weather).

First, one identifies revenue capacity. Revenue capacity is defined as the ability of municipalities to raise revenue from all of the sources they are authorized to tax, even if they choose not to tax a particular base. Capacity is calculated using the “representative tax system” approach, where all communities use a standard uniform tax rate against the tax base. The rate is determined by ensuring that the statewide rate raises enough revenue to cover existing expenditures. Second, one identifies expected expenditures–the average level of spending based on the municipality’s underlying socioeconomic and physical characteristics. This number is is calculated using regression analysis to predict a municipality’s expenditures based on actual values of the underlying characteristics. One purpose of deriving expected expenditures is to remove the variation in expenditures due to the choices of local officials who may favor particular government programs.

The study focused on the costs of providing largely non-educational local services, primarily public safety. It found that large fiscal disparities in Connecticut were primarily driven by their differences in revenue raising capacity. The uneven distribution of the property tax base coupled with the relative dependence on property tax revenues in the state meant that resource-rich municipalities had, on average, per capita revenue capacity eight times that of resource-poor towns. The cost of providing municipal services was less dispersed, with the highest-cost municipalities spending 1.3 times that of the lowest-cost towns. Importantly, the study also found that non-school revenue grants from the state had limited effect in reducing fiscal disparities.

What can tax capacity studies tell us about Illinois’s fiscal problems?

Illinois has a particularly difficult choice when it comes to future tax adjustments. First, the debt overhang at the state level is so large that any future tax increases will necessarily be directed to paying down debt rather than purchasing new services. Incremental tax increases will pay for services already consumed and, as such, it is difficult to see how future taxes will provide governments with resources to support programs that enhance growth. Second, capacity studies, such as Gordon et al. (2016), suggest that Illinois has already reached its capacity limits. While it would be a stretch to adapt this to the revenue-hill concept of actual declines in revenues in response to tax hikes, it does imply that Illinois has little room to increase taxes without reducing economic activity in ways that would be damaging. The depth of the problem increases when recognizing that many Illinois municipalities also face revenue gaps that would make the compound effects of a state tax increase coupled with a local increase that much worse. As these studies show, there tends to be considerable variation in both the level of expenditures and available revenues across any state when it comes to financing government services. The question then becomes what is the geography of tax capacity in Illinois?

In a second blog, we will apply local revenue capacity and service cost to Illinois municipalities. Stay tuned to see what fiscal disparities might exist for municipalities in Cook County.

  1. Norcross, E., & Gonzalez, O. (2016). Ranking the States By Fiscal Condition.
  2. Gordon, T., Auxier, R., & Iselin, J. (2016). Assessing Fiscal Capacities of States.
  3. Haughwout, A., Inman, R., Craig, S., & Luce, T. (2003). Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities.
  4. Zhao, B., & Weiner, J. (2015). Measuring Municipal Fiscal Disparities in Connecticut.

Seventh District Update, September 2016

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First, a (repeat) repeat special announcement: As a Midwest Economy blog reader, you may also want to sign up to follow our new Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC), which is a survey of business contacts conducted to support the Seventh Federal Reserve District’s contribution to the Beige Book. The Chicago Fed produces diffusion indexes based on the quantitative questions in the survey. Click here to sign up for email alerts and click here to view the latest release.

If you are a Seventh District business leader and would like to share your perspective on current economic conditions with us, you are welcome to participate in the CFSBC. Please send an email with your contact information to thomas.walstrum@chi.frb.org.

And now, a summary of economic conditions in the Seventh District from the latest release of the Beige Book and from other indicators of regional business activity:

  • Overall conditions: Growth in economic activity in the Seventh District picked up to a moderate pace in July and early August, and contacts expect growth to remain moderate over the next six to twelve months.
  • Consumer spending: Growth in consumer spending slowed notably with most segments reporting little change in sales. Auto sales slowed some, but remained strong.
  • Business Spending: Growth in business spending picked up to a moderate pace. Retail inventories were somewhat higher than desired because of softer sales. Current capital expenditures picked up to a moderate pace, while hiring continued at a modest rate.
  • Construction and Real Estate: Activity increased slightly overall. Residential construction and home sales increased slightly. Demand for nonresidential construction picked up some, and commercial real estate activity increased slightly.
  • Manufacturing: Growth in manufacturing production picked up to a moderate pace. Activity continued to be strong in autos and aerospace, and increased in most other industries.
  • Banking and finance: Conditions improved modestly. Equity prices were higher, volatility was low, and loan demand from small and middle market businesses grew modestly. Consumer loan demand increased slightly.
  • Prices and Costs: Cost pressures were unchanged and remained mild. Most energy and metals prices were flat and remained low. Retail prices changed little and labor cost pressures were steady.
  • Agriculture: Already low expectations for farm incomes deteriorated over the reporting period as the potential for a record national harvest pushed prices down further.

The Midwest Economy Index (MEI) decreased to −0.14 in July from −0.04 in June. The relative MEI moved down to +0.03 in July from +0.38 in June. July’s value for the relative MEI indicates that Midwest economic growth was quite close to what would typically be suggested by the growth rate of the national economy.

The Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC) Activity Index increased to −18 from −23, suggesting that growth in economic activity remained at a modest pace in July and early August. The CFSBC Manufacturing Activity Index increased to a neutral value from −31, while the CFSBC Nonmanufacturing Activity Index declined to −27 from −18.

Detroit and Chicago: Real Property Value Comparisons

Both Chicago and Detroit have become poster children for city government financial stress in recent years. Chicago’s city and school district alike have been running structural deficits, meaning that the government has been covering its normal operating expenditures by issuing or over-extending debt and running down its assets. Both Chicago’s municipal government and school district face large shortfalls in required contributions for the future pensions of current and retired employees. Both have raised local property taxes as partial steps toward balancing their budgets. In the case of Detroit, the city has only just emerged from Chapter 9 bankruptcy while its school district teeters on insolvency under state-mandated “emergency manager” operation.

Are these places comparable in terms of their outlooks and situation? The value of real property in each place offers one fascinating indicator of the resources available to their local governments, as well as a look into how private homeowners and commercial property owners perceive the general prospects of Detroit and Chicago.

Why examine real property values? In some sense, real estate and improvements are long-lived assets that are largely fixed in place. In the market for these properties, buyers and sellers must assess and incorporate the government fiscal liabilities and service benefits – present and future – attached to these properties in the prices at which they buy and sell. High (and rising) property values may indicate that home owners and commercial property owners expect that the prospects for value in these locations are good and that they will continue to improve. And from the local government’s perspective, high values indicate that there may be room for further imposition of local taxes to fund government services, if need be.

Nuts and bolts

The estimation of the value of real property—land and improvements– in a locality is far from an exact science. The actual sales prices of property can be thought of as one reflection of an individual parcel’s value. However, as we saw during the financial crisis last decade, sales transaction prices can be very volatile, and sometimes speculative. More practically, parcels of property do not turn over frequently, so that transactions prices of all property parcels are not observed in any one year. In practice, then, local public officials often rely on various estimation methods in assessing the value of property for taxation purposes, most of which involve using a sample of information from similar properties that were sold during a year. From the recorded sales price and a property’s particular features such as size, location, age, and configuration, the property assessment office infers the value of each property and, ultimately, the total value of property against which taxes are levied.1 These taxable values are often termed assessed values or sometimes equalized assessed values and often represent some fixed percentage of market or true value.2

In the charts, we draw on such data from the local and state governments of Detroit, Chicago, and Illinois to estimate the market or true value of real property in both Detroit and in Chicago.3 For Detroit, figures on total assessed property value are published in the city’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR). By law, assessed value must amount to one-half of true value in Michigan. And so, to arrive at our estimates of full value, we simply double the assessed value. We believe that this yields a far upper bound on the value of residential property in Detroit because there is much evidence that, following the steep plunge in Detroit’s property market over the last decade, assessments were not reduced to accord with actual market value in a timely fashion.4

Drawing on prices of homes that recorded sales, the following chart shows that average home prices began to fall in 2004, while assessed value did not begin to fall until 2009.Detroit_Assessed_HomePricesFor Chicago, a prominent local government “watchdog” and research foundation has long been using state and city data on recorded property sales by class of property to estimate full market values.5 The accuracy of these data is believed to be reasonable, though far from exact.6

What do we see?

Due to lags in data availability, the estimates below are representative through calendar year 2014. The charts display total property value across all types, as well as the largest category in both Chicago and Detroit, that being residential property.

As shown here, Chicago real property value rose dramatically during the early part of last decade before dropping off just as dramatically. Detroit’s property values remained flat. However, Detroit’s apparent stability belies the fact that assessed values of residential properties have not been allowed to fall off in tandem with actual market transactions price there. As measured by volume of sales, the market for residential real estate in the city of Detroit became almost nonexistent during this period.7 Few homes were sold using conventional financing; almost all of them sold for cash. By some estimates, prices of homes sold fell by many multiples during this time, though they have since been heading back up in parts of the city.

Even using generous measures, and with rising home prices in some neighborhoods, residential property value overall in Detroit have continued to drift lower in recent years. In contrast, following the steep decline, Chicago property values have begun to recover for both residential and commercial (not shown) property.

Most telling, at over $80,000 per resident, the value of overall taxable real property in Chicago remained markedly higher than that of Detroit as of 2014. By even our generous measure, Detroit’s property values were only about $25,000 per resident.Detroit_Chicago_PropValuesDiscussion

It would appear that, as measured by real estate values, Chicago’s economy and prospects remain much stronger than Detroit’s. And from a local government perspective, Chicago’s taxable resources with which to pay down liabilities and fund public services appear to be much larger. Of course, there are myriad political and institutional factors at play that render such a simple assessment of wealth inadequate to characterize the fiscal capacity of these cities. In both places, for example, property wealth is concentrated in a subset of places such as near the downtown areas and along the waterfronts. Accordingly, it may be difficult to tap available property wealth selectively because existing statute largely requires that tax rates be applied uniformly. And voters and their representatives may be reluctant to allow tax hikes at all. Similarly, there may be different levels of sensitivity to taxation in these two places and among different constituencies. For example, the imposition of new and higher taxation may cause economic activity and investment to decline more sharply in one place as opposed to another.

More broadly, we might ask whether property wealth is a good indicator of potential resources that local governments may draw on to fund services. A look at more U.S. cities may be helpful. The next chart undertakes the same exercise for the most populous cities. Here we see that Chicago continues to look fairly robust by this measure, though less so than the cities of San Diego, Los Angeles, Austin, and New York City.MajorCities_ProvValues

  1. Assessed value of property for taxation purposes is often a fixed percentage of market value across all property parcels, or else it is a fixed percentage across all parcels of a certain type or class such as residential, commercial or industrial. In turn, estimates of full value of all property can be made by taking sample average ratios of “assessed value/sales price” and applying these ratios to all parcels’ assessed values.
  2. Equalized assessed values refers to the practice of further adjusting the totalities of assessed value of property across jurisdictions so that each locale’s assessed valuation represents the same or “equalized” value in relation to (percent)  sales price or true value.
  3. The city of Detroit also taxes tangible personal property of commercial enterprises such as computing equipment and furniture; Chicago does not.
  4. Using sales price and assessed values for a sample of 8,650 residential parcels in 2010, Hodge et al find an average assessment to sales price ratio of 11.47, which suggests an average over assessment or property values many times over. See Timothy R. Hodge, Daniel P. McMillen, Gary Sands, and Mark Skidmore, 2016, “Assessment Inequity in a Declining Housing Market: The Case of Detroit,” Real Estate Economics.
  5. See https://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/Estimated%20Full%20Value%20of%20Real%20Property%20in%20Cook%20County%202005_2014.pdf
  6. Discrepancies arise because only sample values of real estate transactions are available in any one year. In addition, full value projections derive from the median value of property in each class. However, the median property value may not represent the entire distribution of property values.
  7. See http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000739-Detroit-Housing-Tracker-Q1-2016.pdf

Seventh District Update, July 2016

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First, a (repeat) repeat special announcement: As a Midwest Economy blog reader, you may also want to sign up to follow our new Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC), which is a survey of business contacts conducted to support the Seventh Federal Reserve District’s contribution to the Beige Book. The Chicago Fed produces diffusion indexes based on the quantitative questions in the survey. Click here to sign up for email alerts and click here to view the latest release.

If you are a Seventh District business leader and would like to share your perspective on current economic conditions with us, you are welcome to participate in the CFSBC. Please send an email with your contact information to thomas.walstrum@chi.frb.org.

And now, a summary of economic conditions in the Seventh District from the latest release of the Beige Book and from other indicators of regional business activity:

  • Overall conditions: Growth in economic activity in the Seventh District continued at a modest pace in late May and June, and contacts expect growth to remain modest over the next 6 to 12 months.
  • Consumer spending: Growth continued at a moderate pace. Auto sales remained robust.
  • Business Spending: Growth remained modest. Most retailers and manufacturers reported comfortable inventory levels. Current capital outlays remained modest and plans for future outlays declined. Hiring continued at a modest rate, and there was an uptick in expectations for future hiring.
  • Construction and Real Estate: Activity increased slightly overall. Residential construction was little changed, while home sales increased in most locations. Demand for nonresidential construction increased slightly and commercial real estate activity rose modestly.
  • Manufacturing: Growth remained modest. Activity continued to be strong in autos and aerospace, but remained weaker in most other industries.
  • Banking and finance: Developments were mixed. Financial market volatility increased significantly, driven primarily by the United Kingdom’s vote to exit the European Union. Business and consumer loan demand grew slightly.
  • Prices and Costs: Cost pressures were unchanged and remained mild. Most energy and metals prices were flat and remained low. Retail prices were flat and labor cost pressures were steady.
  • Agriculture: Corn and soybean price gains led more farmers to lock in prices for the fall harvest, though the increases were not enough to change contacts’ expectations that farm incomes will be weak this year.

The Midwest Economy Index (MEI) decreased to +0.12 in May from +0.28 in April. The relative MEI declined to +0.53 in May from +0.71 in April. May’s value for the relative MEI indicates that Midwest economic growth was somewhat higher than what would typically be suggested by the growth rate of the national economy.

The Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC) Activity Index decreased to −24 from −21, suggesting that growth in economic activity remained modest in late May and June. The CFSBC Manufacturing Activity Index declined to −28 from −17, while the CFSBC Nonmanufacturing Activity Index ticked up to −22 from −23.

Seventh District Update, June 2016

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First, a (repeat) special announcement: As a Midwest Economy blog reader, you may also want to sign up to follow our new Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC), which is a survey of business contacts conducted to support the Seventh Federal Reserve District’s contribution to the Beige Book. The Chicago Fed produces diffusion indexes based on the quantitative questions in the survey. Click here to sign up for email alerts and click here to view the latest release.

And now, a summary of economic conditions in the Seventh District from the latest release of the Beige Book and from other indicators of regional business activity:

  • Overall conditions: Growth in economic activity in the Seventh District slowed to a modest pace in April and early May, tempering contacts’ optimism about growth over the next 6 to 12 months.
  • Consumer spending: Growth in consumer spending picked up to a moderate pace. Retailers in Michigan indicated that sales were the best they had seen in over a year. Auto sales remained robust.
  • Business Spending: Most retailers and manufacturers reported comfortable inventory levels. Current capital outlays and plans for future outlays slowed to a modest pace. Hiring also slowed to a more modest rate, as did expectations for future hiring.
  • Construction and Real Estate: Residential construction rose slightly, and residential rents and home prices rose moderately. Demand for nonresidential construction was little changed and commercial real estate activity rose modestly.
  • Manufacturing: Manufacturing production grew at a modest pace. Activity remained strong in autos and aerospace, but was slower in most other industries.
  • Banking and finance: On balance, financial conditions improved marginally. Market volatility decreased, high yield debt issuance rebounded, and upgrades outpaced downgrades for credit ratings of U.S. public financial firms. Business and consumer loan demand was little changed on balance.
  • Prices and Costs: Cost pressures again tightened some, but remained mild overall. Most energy and metals prices increased (steel in particular), but the level remained low. Retail prices increased slightly, as did wage costs. Growth in non-wage labor costs was steady.
  • Agriculture: Corn and soybean prices rose, improving farmers’ earnings prospects.

The Midwest Economy Index (MEI) was unchanged at +0.25 in April. The relative MEI increased to +0.71 in April from +0.67 in March. April’s value for the relative MEI indicates that Midwest economic growth was moderately higher than what would typically be suggested by the growth rate of the national economy.

The Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC) Activity Index decreased to –23 from zero, suggesting that growth in economic activity slowed to a modest pace in April and early May. The CFSBC Manufacturing Activity Index declined to –23 from +27, while the CFSBC Nonmanufacturing Activity Index decreased to –24 from –15.

Why Chicago is not Detroit

By William Sander and William Testa

Over the past decade, 17 of the 20 largest cities in the United States gained population. Recent academic studies on these trends have attributed them to changes in residential preferences, the location of skilled jobs, and cultural amenities. Both Chicago (third largest) and Detroit (18th) are exceptions to these trends. The population of the city of Chicago declined modestly from 2.9 million in 2000 to 2.7 million in 2010 after increasing during the 1990s. The population of the city of Detroit has declined more drastically over time from a peak of 1.8 million in 1950 to about 700,000 today; the city filed for bankruptcy in 2013. Since 2010, the population of the city of Chicago has increased modestly (1%), while Detroit’s population has continued to decline. Figure 1 shows population trends for Chicago, Detroit, and other Industrial Belt cities, which have traditionally depended heavily on manufacturing for employment. While Chicago remains much larger than the others despite recent sluggish growth, Detroit has seen a dramatic change in its position.

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Due to worsening fiscal problems and a rising homicide rate, Chicago’s prospects have recently been equated with Detroit’s, at least by the popular press. LeDuff1 writes in The New York Times “So Detroit files for bankruptcy…Pay close attention because it may be coming to you soon…Chicago.”  An Investor’s Business Daily editorial notes that “Chicago appears to be following Detroit’s lead to financial disaster.”2 An article in the Financial Times suggests that Chicago’s problems are not too different from Detroit’s.3 And so on.

For one, both places have been severely challenged by loss of manufacturing activity. Detroit and Chicago have lost over 100,000 and 300,000 manufacturing jobs, respectively, since the late 1970s; other midwestern cities (Milwaukee, Cleveland) have not been far behind. The inverse relationship between an historic MSA concentration of manufacturing jobs and subsequent growth from 1969 onward is evident for the most prominent Great Lakes metropolitan areas. More broadly, the growth-retarding effect from manufacturing on U.S. metropolitan areas over the 1960–90 period has been documented in a statistical study by Harvard’s Edward Glaeser.4 As evidenced in figure 2, manufacturing employment losses and depopulation within the central city were contemporaneous in both Detroit and Chicago.

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Declines in manufacturing jobs are a result of improvements in manufacturing productivity as well as the movement of production elsewhere including both suburban areas and overseas. For example, data for Michigan indicates that vehicle production in 2015 was at about the same level as 1990. However, employment in producing vehicles over this period declined by about one-half.

Suburbanization has taken no less a toll on central city manufacturing employment in both Chicago and Detroit alike. In the Chicago metropolitan area, only 9% of jobs are now in the manufacturing sector, while manufacturing accounts for 13% of jobs in the Detroit area. In the city of Chicago, only 6% of jobs remain in manufacturing and 10% in the city of Detroit. As reported by John McDonald for Detroit circa 1950, 61% of the Detroit area’s manufacturing jobs were to be found in the city, with another 13% in adjacent Dearborn, domicile of Ford Motor Company.5 The entire range of the city-suburb split in manufacturing jobs for both MSAs can be seen in figure 3. The advent of controlled access divided highways pulled manufacturing jobs outward within metropolitan areas to take advantage of lower land prices and lower shipping costs.

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Although both Chicago and Detroit lost a large number of jobs in manufacturing, it is also evident from figure 2 that the city of Chicago withstood the manufacturing exodus more robustly than Detroit. Unlike Detroit, its population did not decline apace with manufacturing from 1950 onward. Similarly, it did not experience the same degree of job declines. More recently, for example, over the 2000 to 2010 period, metropolitan Detroit experienced a 21.2% decline in employment, while the Chicago metropolitan area lost 7.7% of its jobs. Indeed, the past decade was disastrous for Detroit relative to Chicago. About one in four workers were unemployed in the motor city by the end of the decade. In Chicago, the unemployment rate peaked at a little more than one in ten workers (see figure 4).

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The resident population of the city of Detroit has also come to be characterized by a much higher degree of poverty and minority population. The share of households in poverty approaches four in ten in the city of Detroit, compared with 23% in Chicago. According to the latest decennial Census, the Detroit population overwhelmingly identifies as “black” (83%), up from 29% in 1960. Owing to the city’s economic collapse and to the suburbanization of (mostly white) population, by 1990 Detroit had become one of the most racially divided metropolitan areas in the United States. Social and economic issues arising from racial polarization since early in the twentieth century have been cited as a major constraint on the growth and development of Detroit and its suburbs.

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Chicago’s racial/ethnic groups also tend to be highly segregated; however, the overall composition of the city’s population is more balanced. Approximately 32% of Census respondents identify as black (including those reporting Hispanic background); 45% report as non-Hispanic white; and 28% as Hispanic. More than 20% of Chicago residents are foreign born. Despite the impression of a balanced population that such figures suggest, racial isolation in Chicago is very similar to that in Detroit when measured on a block to block basis.

Chicago bright spots

Although Chicago has many of Detroit’s problems and more than twice the number of residents living in poverty, Chicago also has many positive features relative to Detroit.

One of the reasons that one might be more optimistic about Chicago’s future is that, in spite of declines in population growth, the city of Chicago has become increasingly attractive to non-Hispanic white college graduates, while the inner-ring of suburbs of Chicago have become more attractive to African-American and Hispanic college graduates. Further, within the city of Chicago, household locations along Chicago’s lakeshore (particularly on the north side of the city), have become particularly attractive to more affluent, college-educated households. Studies indicate that the attractiveness of the city of Chicago to college graduates is at least partly related to growth in skilled jobs in and around the central business district.

Although there are recent indications to the contrary, Detroit has been less successful in attracting resident college graduates. Only 12% of the population twenty-five and older in the city of Detroit are college graduates. In the city of Chicago, 34% of the adult population has at least a bachelor’s degree. In popular areas of Chicago such as Lincoln Park, the vast majority of adults have at least a bachelor’s degree. Further, about half of the twenty-something college graduates in the Chicago metropolitan area live in the city of Chicago, while only 10% of college graduates in their 20s in the Detroit metropolitan area live in the city of Detroit. For college graduates with a school-age child, the percentage living in the city of Detroit is even lower (5%), versus 15% for Chicago. Of the college graduates working in the city of Detroit, only 22% live there. In the case of Chicago, the corresponding statistic is 61%.

Further, median household income in the city of Detroit is only a little over half of median income in Chicago. The poverty rate in Detroit is almost twice as high as Chicago’s, although the city of Chicago has almost twice as many poor residents. The city of Chicago employs about four times as many people as the city of Detroit. About 30% of the jobs in the Chicago metropolitan area are in the city of Chicago, while the corresponding statistic for Detroit is only 14%.

Why Are Chicago’s Prospects Brighter?

For one, Chicago began the era of de-industrialization with a more diversified economy with which to reinvent itself, especially in business services and financial services. In addition to its manufacturing (and goods transportation) prowess, Chicago has long been a purveyor of business and business-meeting services, retail, and financial services to the surrounding Midwest region and beyond. For example, Chicago’s large exchange-traded derivatives industry evolved from the city’s role as a nineteenth century market and wholesale distributor of grain, lumber, and meat. Its highly concentrated management consulting industry owes its twenty-first century success in part to the need of New York City financial houses to closely appraise the operations of Midwest manufacturing companies in the issuance of corporate debt. And the nexus of passenger railroad lines and (later) passenger air travel in Chicago cultivated one of the nation’s leading industries in business meetings and conventions. Accordingly, the profound exodus of manufacturing that occurred from almost all large U.S. cities did not devastate Chicago’s job base to the same degree as happened in Detroit and some other Midwest cities, although some parts of Chicago were hit hard. Admittedly, the Detroit area also maintains very strong business services industries, largely related to the auto industry, but for the most part these services are in suburban locations. In Chicago, many service businesses remain in the city.

Figures 2 and 3 show trends in population and manufacturing in Chicago and Detroit from 1900 to date. In both cities, one can see the spectacular rise in both manufacturing and population to 1950 followed by an equally spectacular decline. However, while population declines in Chicago have been profound, they diverge markedly from the Detroit experience. Nonetheless, much like Detroit, vast neighborhood areas of the city of Chicago were also impoverished by job and population flight to the suburbs, especially those neighborhoods that depended on the middle-income jobs associated with freight and manufacturing. Wages and jobs outside of the central area of Chicago have declined, even while the central area has prospered. Today, many Chicago neighborhoods find themselves challenged in the same ways as neighborhoods in Detroit and other industrial cities by poverty, violence, sub-standard housing, and a lack of immediate and accessible economic opportunities.

Chicago has arguably developed a stronger reputation as a city in which to do business than Detroit and some other midwestern cities. At the turn of this century, Chicago began positioning itself to be one of the emerging “global cities” that had successfully forged commercial connections to other cities of its kind around the world. Global cities are characterized by the most skilled occupations and activities in business services, finance, education, and technology; well-educated residents; forward-looking business leaders; and globally connected transportation and communications networks, among other attributes.

Owing to their strategic importance and global reach, corporate headquarters operations have become a hallmark of success for global cities. Early last decade, Chicago became the global headquarters of Boeing. Since then, the city has attracted Archer Daniels Midland, GE Healthcare, Oscar Mayer, and ConAgra, among others. Relocation of headquarters from the suburbs of Chicago to the central city has also taken place, including United (Air), Kraft Heinz, and Motorola Mobility.

In Detroit, both the IT software company Compuware and Quicken Loans have relocated operations from the suburbs to the downtown area (in 2003 and 2010, respectively). However, the scale of these moves falls far short of similar activity in Chicago.

Some argue that headquarters operations have downsized over time, representing far fewer direct jobs than in the past when headquarters often included back office, research, advertising, and payroll processing operations. However, the presence of headquarters is coincident with a much vaster nearby network of financial and business services, many of which are supported by colocation with the strategic headquarters of corporations.

The upshot then is that, even though the older industrial neighborhoods of Chicago share many of the same challenges as those of Detroit, Chicago has been better able to withstand the decline of industrial production. Whereas the city of Chicago has about four times as many people as the city of Detroit, Chicago has ten times as many jobs in finance, eight times as many jobs in professional services, six times as many jobs in education, and five times as many jobs in accommodation and food services. Since 1998, the Chicago area has gained almost 60,000 jobs in business services, while Detroit has lost over 35,000 jobs in the sector. During this period, Chicago also gained more than 20,000 jobs in colleges and universities, while Detroit gained none.

It is clear that Detroit needs to diversify its legacy industrial clusters as well as to build on them. This focus on industrial rebirth includes further specialization in the auto industry—especially R&D, as well as logistics and transportation, engineering and design, technology start-ups, and business services and finance. Indeed, diversification to a technology-oriented industrial structure has raised fortunes of old industrial regions elsewhere, with the Boston area being a prominent example.

We would note that a number of Rust Belt cities with about as many jobs as Detroit, including Cleveland, St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh have significantly fewer people living in them. This implies that Detroit’s population may not yet have reached a floor. Unlike Detroit, the city of Chicago remains an attractive place to work and live, especially for young college graduates. This could change over time if Detroit can reinvent itself and make further improvements in the delivery of basic public services, especially basic education and public safety. Chicago faces many of the same challenges in improving public services, and in putting its underlying fiscal affairs on a sounder footing.

William Sander, Professor of Economics, DePaul University, Chicago.

William Testa, President and Director of Regional Programs, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

A preliminary version of this paper was presented at Inner City Economic Development Summit in Detroit, September 2015.

  1. LeDuff, Charlie. 2013. “Come see Detroit, America’s future.” The New York Times, July 24.
  2. Investor’s Business Daily. 2013. “Emmanuel’s Chicago is on the path to be the next Detroit.” August 7.
  3. Sender, Henny, Stephen Foley, and Richard, McGregor. 2013. “Descent into despair.” The Financial Times. July 26.
  4. Glaeser, Edward, Jose A. Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer. 1995.”Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities,” Journal of Monetary Economics 36 (1): 117-143.
  5. McDonald, John F. 2013. “What Happened To and In Detroit?” unpublished paper.

Updated Forecasts of Seventh District GSP Growth

Several years ago, the Chicago Fed began providing estimates of annual gross state product (GSP) growth for each of the five states in the Seventh Federal Reserve District.1 The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) releases annual GSP data for the prior year each June. This post discusses GSP projections for 2015 and presents an alternative forecasting model using quarterly GSP data from the BEA.2

The 2015 Growth Picture

To provide context for our projections, we first take a brief look at the main indicators of our model. Figure 1 shows annual U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth and GSP growth aggregated across the five states in the Seventh District from 2005 through 2014. Actual GSP data for 2015 will not be released for another month. However, we can get a sense of what this data is likely to show by comparing the recent histories in the figure. While growth in the Seventh District has lagged behind the nation in recent years, it has tended to follow a similar trend over longer periods. The U.S. maintained an annual growth rate of around 2.4% from 2014 to 2015, providing a reasonable starting point for our estimate of District growth in 2015.

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The Chicago Fed’s Midwest Economy Index (MEI) then provides a useful link between national and regional growth that can give us a sense of the likely persistence of the recent shortfall between District and national growth. As figure 2 shows, the MEI indicated that the Midwest economy experienced growth that was somewhat above trend in the first half of 2015 and slightly below trend in the second half. Additionally, the relative MEI dipped below zero in the third quarter, suggesting that Midwest economic growth was further below its trend than national growth was in the second half of the year. Though the MEI does not explicitly pertain to GSP growth, historically a zero value for the index has been roughly consistent with 1.5% annual GSP growth for the District. In light of this, both the MEI and relative MEI suggest that District GSP growth in 2015 likely rebounded from its 2014 rate of 1.1% to somewhat above its trend rate of 1.5%, but still below the national growth rate of 2.4%.

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Finally, we turn to annualized quarterly growth of state real personal income over 2015which provides an indication of how state-specific factors may have affected District GSP growth in 2015. Figure 3 shows that both Illinois and Michigan experienced strong income growth in the first quarter of 2015. Though the District states generally experienced weak income growth in the second quarter in comparison with the national average, growth rates in the remaining quarters of 2015 were of similar magnitudes to the national rate. Taken together, these data suggest some likely variation in GSP growth rates across the District states, but for the most part, they are consistent with the MEI and U.S. GDP growth data in figures 1 and 2.

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Forecasts for 2015

Our forecasts for 2015 combine the information in the indicators discussed in the previous section to arrive at an estimate of annual GSP growth for the District states and the District as a whole. Since 2011, the Chicago Fed has used the following statistical model to estimate annual GSP growth:

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This model explains the annual GSP growth rate of each Seventh District state as a function of national GDP growth, regional economic conditions as captured by the monthly MEI and relative MEI, and state-specific conditions (specifically, quarterly real personal income growth and annual GSP growth in the previous year).3 We aggregate state projections into a District-wide forecast using each state’s respective share of nominal District GSP.

Figure 4 shows for each District state and the entire District their respective historical GSP growth (blue bars), in-sample fits (orange lines) of GSP growth obtained from our statistical model, and 2015 out-of-sample projections (green lines). With the exception of Iowa, the model predicts an increase in the GSP growth rate for the Seventh District states, as well as the District as a whole. Interestingly, this seems out of line with the national GDP data and the MEI and relative MEI data discussed earlier. It is of note, however, that for 2014 the model also estimated higher GSP growth than what was realized for each state.

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Motivated by our model’s recent shortcomings, we developed a similar model estimated using the experimental quarterly GSP data recently published by the BEA. Figure 4 also contains projections of annual GSP growth (red bars) obtained from this new model. At the time of writing, these data were available through the third quarter of 2015. To obtain a GSP growth projection for all of 2015 with these data, we need only estimate the fourth quarter’s value. Using the new statistical model to obtain this estimate and combining it with the data from the first three quarters, we arrive at an alternative forecast for 2015.

Figure 4 clearly shows a large difference between our two forecasting models. As table 1 further demonstrates, the projections from our new quarterly model (Q4 forecasted column) are below those of our original annual model in every instance, and often by quite large magnitudes. For the District as a whole, our quarterly model predicts more modest GSP growth of 1.6%, compared with 2.5% as forecasted by the annual model. This estimate from our quarterly model is also in line with the previous evidence suggesting growth was slightly above the historical trend of 1.5% but below the national growth rate of 2.4% for 2015.

Table 1. Annual GSP Growth Forecasts for 20154

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To illustrate the sources of the discrepancy between our model forecasts, we plot in figure 5 the annualized quarterly GSP growth data from the BEA (blue bars) for 2015, including our fourth quarter estimates (red bars) and fitted values from the model (orange lines). It is important to note that both our annual and quarterly models use the same 2015 data for the variables that they share in common, with the exception of the three quarters of GSP data that we have for 2015. These data show sharp contractions in GSP for every District state (with the exception of Illinois) in the first quarter. More than anything else, this feature of the quarterly data is the dominant source of the discrepancies between our annual and quarterly model projections. The model fits in figure 5 make this clear, as they demonstrate very large negative residuals in the first quarter and only small misses in the other quarters, reflecting the fact that the declines in GSP in the first quarter are not consistent with the indicators in our statistical model.

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It is possible that the quarterly GSP data for 2015 will be revised upon the release of the annual figure next month. As noted previously, our model predicts weak first quarters for the District states, but not nearly as dramatically as what has been released by the BEA thus far. Considering the apparent inconsistency between the quarterly data and the model, we also generate a forecast for 2015 that uses the fitted values for the first three quarters of 2015 GSP growth instead of the quarterly data. These projections, presented in the Q1–Q4 forecasted column of table 1, are larger than the quarterly model’s estimates using the quarterly values for 2015, but are still below those of the annual model. Moreover, these projections suggest that at 2.0%, District GSP growth improved in 2015 and was closer to the national average, but still below it.

Conclusion

We will continue to monitor the performance of both our annual and quarterly forecasting models. However, based on the results presented here, we intend to report annual GSP growth rates for each District state from our new quarterly model combined with the available quarterly data for the 2015 forecast (as presented in the Q4 forecasted column in table 1). From now on, we will continue to report estimates from this model as long as the quarterly data from the BEA make it possible to do so.

  1. The Seventh District comprises parts of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin, as well as all of Iowa.
  2. The quarterly GSP data provided by the BEA is still in an experimental phase. For more information, visit https://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm.
  3. The model is explained in more detail in Brave and Wang (2012).
  4. To allow for “like-for-like” comparisons among District forecasts, we aggregate state-specific annual forecasts to the District level using annual nominal GSP shares. The 2015 projections were aggregated using the 2014 shares.

Seventh District Update, April 2016

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First, a (repeat) special announcement: As a Midwest Economy blog reader, you may also want to sign up to follow our new Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC), which is a survey of business contacts conducted to support the Seventh Federal Reserve District’s contribution to the Beige Book. The Chicago Fed produces diffusion indexes based on the quantitative questions in the survey. Click here to sign up for email alerts and click here to view the latest release.

And now, a summary of economic conditions in the Seventh District from the latest release of the Beige Book and from other indicators of regional business activity:

  • Overall conditions: Growth in economic activity in the Seventh District picked up to a moderate pace in late February and March, and contacts expressed renewed optimism about the outlook for growth over the next 6 to 12 months.
  • Consumer spending: Growth in consumer spending maintained a modest pace, though, in contrast to the national data, reports of new and used vehicle sales continued to be strong.
  • Business Spending: Most retailers and manufacturers reported comfortable inventory levels. Current capital outlays and plans for future outlays picked up to a moderate pace. Hiring also picked up to a moderate pace, as did the number of contacts saying they planned to increase their workforces in the future.
  • Construction and Real Estate: Residential construction edged up and residential rents and home prices rose slightly. Demand for nonresidential construction was little changed and commercial real estate activity rose moderately.
  • Manufacturing: While manufacturing production rose at a modest rate early in the reporting period, growth increased to a moderate pace by the end March. Activity remained strong in the auto and aerospace industries and picked up in most other industries.
  • Banking and finance: Overall, financial conditions improved some. Equity markets regained much of their losses from the previous reporting period and volatility subsided. Business loan demand improved marginally and consumer loan demand was little changed, on balance.
  • Prices and Costs: Cost pressures increased some in late February and early March, but remained mild overall. Most energy and metals prices increased, but remained low. Retail prices changed little on balance, and wage and nonwage cost pressures remained mild.
  • Agriculture: Corn, soybean, and wheat prices moved up, and fertilizer prices and land rents moved down, but these changes were not large enough to appreciably improve crop farmers’ earnings prospects.

The Midwest Economy Index (MEI) moved up to +0.07 in February from −0.09 in January. The relative MEI fell to +0.54 in February from +0.73 in January. February’s value for the relative MEI indicates that Midwest economic growth was somewhat higher than what would typically be suggested by the growth rate of the national economy.

The Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions (CFSBC) Activity Index increased to –4 from –20, suggesting that growth in economic activity picked up to a moderate pace in late February and March. The CFSBC Manufacturing Activity Index rose to +23 from –19, while the CFSBC Nonmanufacturing Activity Index increased to –19 from –21.

Early Benchmarking the State Payroll Employment Survey—Update

In June of 2015, I wrote a blog post detailing a method called early benchmarking, which predicts how the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) will revise the state payroll employment survey data when it updates its benchmarks each March (the method was first introduced by our colleagues at the Dallas Fed). The primary source of the revisions for state payroll employment (also known as the Current Employment Statistics, or CES) is the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). While the BLS only rebenchmarks the CES using new QCEW data yearly, QCEW data are released quarterly, so it’s possible to use new QCEW data to predict how the BLS will revise the CES (this process is explained in detail in my earlier post). Benchmark revisions to the CES can be quite large, and we have found that our early benchmarking procedure typically reduces their size.

The BLS recently released the March 2016 benchmarked data, so we can see how the early benchmarking method performed for the Seventh Federal Reserve District and the District states for 2015. Table 1 summarizes how much employment grew in the Seventh District and District states in 2015 based on when the data were benchmarked using the QCEW. At the District level, the early benchmarking procedure performed marginally better: It underestimated job growth by 32,000, while data benchmarked in March 2015 underestimated job growth by 38,000. Both datasets estimated a 1.1 percent growth rate for 2015.

Early benchmarking is more useful at the state level, because CES sample sizes are smaller. For 2015, the largest error was for Illinois, where the March 2015 benchmarked data estimated that employment declined by 3,000, while the March 2016 benchmarked data indicate that employment actually increased by 51,000. The January 2016 benchmarked data roughly split the difference, estimating job growth of 29,000.

Table 1 - Job Growth

The figures that follow show graphically the differences between the three series summarized in table 1 for the District and District states. The dashed portion of the lines for each series represents data that are not benchmarked using the QCEW. For example, the early benchmarked data are benchmarked using QCEW data through June 2015, while the March 2016 benchmarked data use QCEW data through September 2015. In some figures it is clear that the BLS also revises already-benchmarked data, though these revisions are typically small (Wisconsin is an exception for 2014).

Later this year, we will begin publishing early benchmarked estimates of District and District state employment growth on our website on a monthly basis (coinciding with the release of the Midwest Economy Index). We will be sure to notify our Midwest Economy blog readers when we make the estimates available.

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